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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
State vs. Thompson: Defendant was indicted for a felony,
tried and convicted. Subsequent to arraignment he was at liberty
on bail; and, after submission of the cause to the jury, defendant went
to a friend's home, without leaving word with any officer of the court.
The jury returned with a verdict in a short time, and, although officers
were sent to look for defendant, he could not be found. The court
waited for nearly an hour and then received the verdict, which was
"guilty". HELD: The right to be present at the rendition of the
verdict may be waived by voluntarily absenting oneself. The prog-
ress of a trial can not be impeded by such voluntary absence. The
contention that trial counsel was unable properly to represent defend-
ant by reason of intoxication held not sustained by the record.
State vs. Morton County: Certain real estate was sold to defend-
ant for taxes, and taxes and hail indemnity liens for the years 1921,
1922, 1923 and 1924 subsequently became delinquent. The county
then served notice of expiration of the period of redemption, where-
upon the county was entitled to tax deed. Plaintiff then offered to
pay the taxes, but the county claimed the amount due included the
hail indemnity liens. The full amount was then paid and action
brought against defendant for the recovery of the amount of the hail
indemnity. HELD: That the right of redemption granted by Sec-
tion 2202 of the Compiled Laws is in addition to that granted by
Section 2197. It gives one having an interest in land a second chance
by making him a preferred purchaser, but in order to avail himself of
that right he must bring himself within the terms of the statute, which
means paying the full amount due thereon.
State vs. Shahane: While in act of attacking his wife the defend-
ant's father was killed by knife in hand of defendant. Testimony
introduced showed the deceased was subject to epileptic insanity, that
he was dangerous at such times, that a fit was on at time of the attack
on defendant's mother, who ran to defendant for protection and
grabbed the arm holding the knife. Other specific acts of brutality
and violence on the part of deceased were also presented, in rebuttal
of which the State was permitted to show the deceased's general good
reputation. The medical expert testifying as to the deceased's in-
sanity was questioned as to the correctness of contradictory state-
ments in a book on medical jurisprudence on cross-examination.
HELD: Testimony of general reputation is not admissible to rebut
proof of specific acts of violence; and the text of a medical book can
not be used directly or indirectly in opposition to the testimony of a
medical expert for the reason that the author is not under oath and
not subject to cross-examination. New trial granted.
State vs. Rother: Defendant, a bank president, received $2,500
from one M. H. for investment. He delivered four notes held by
the bank, personally guaranteeing payment. The notes not being paid,
they were returned, and the bank's draft for $1.7oo was forwarded to
M. H. A. "memo" note for $I,7OO (Signed "M. H. by R.") was inserted
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in the bank's note pouch. This memo note was found among the
bank's assets when examined by the state bank examiner. R. was
not present at the examination at which the note was exhibited. At
some previous examination an examiner had suggested that the "memo"
note should be pinned to the original notes. This was not done, and
it was carried as an asset for several years, and until it was ordered
removed. Defendant was indicted, tried and found guilty. At the
trial defendant moved to quash the indictment upon the ground that
he had not been in custody at the time of the grand jury investigation,
had no opportunity to challenge the grand jurors, one of whom was
alleged to have acted in the capacity of a prosecutor rather than juror.
Error was also alleged in the following instruction of the trial court:
"Before you can find the defendant guilty you must find that A. (an
officer of the bank present at the time of the examination) is guilty,
and that R. aided and abetted or encouraged A. in committing the
crime. In other words, it would be just the same as though A. was
the defendant here or that they were both defendants. You have to
find A. guilty before you can find R. guilty. If you should find A.
guilty then you would have to find that R. aided and abetted A. in
committing the crime". HELD: It is error, prejudicial to the rights
of the defendant, for the trial court to refuse a defendant, who has
moved to set aside an indictment on one of the grounds specified in
Section 10728 Compiled Laws, opportunity to adduce proof in support
of. the motion. If a law is plain and within the legislative power
it declares itself and the courts have only the simple and obvious duty
to enforce the law according to its terms. The trial court also erred
in giving the quoted instruction, as the question of whether R. intended
to deceive the examiner was for the jury. New trial granted.
CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING
Bar Briefs gladly presents the following from Mr. B. H. Bradford,
a member of the.Committee on Uniform State Laws:
The legal profession of this state has the duty to assume leader-
ship in public matters in'the state and especially is this true with
respect to all public matters pertaining to the system of jurisprudence.
It should be unquestioned that any movement for a change of judicial
procedure or practice should receive the sanction of the State Bar
Association before it is molded into law. If the State Bar Associa-
tion is not recognized by. the Legislature to this extent, the fault must
lie to a large degree with the Bar itself. This fault does not lie in
any lack of ideals nor of effort on the part of the Bar Association.
It is due largely to misunderstanding.
The lay members of the Legislature are prone to look with sus-
picion upon any act sponsored by the Bar Association and to surmise
that the proposal is founded upon a desire to advance the interests
of the members of the *Bar. It is, of course, natural that the profes-
sion, through its association, should seek to raise its standards and
-strengthen its position in society, but aside from this the association,
at each session of the Legislature, finds it necessary to present to the
Legislature measures which are for the benefit of the whole people
and which do not bear the slightest taint of selfishness. In order
that these measures receive the consideration due them, it is neces-
